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2013 Martin Luther King, Jr., Lecture
CIVIL RIGHTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: LESSONS




This Essay pays tribute to justice Thurgood Marshall's race-transcending
vision of universal human dignity, and explores the importance of
building cross-racial alliances to modern civil rights advocacy. justice
Marshall's role as a "Race Man" is evident in much of his
jurisprudence, where he fought for years to promote equal opportunity
and equal justice. As an advocate for all marginalized people, justice
Marshall viewed equal justice as transcending race, and this Essay
suggests that the multi-racial coalition that supported President Obama
aligns with Marshall's vision. The Essay evaluates the civil rights
movement through the lens of Justice Marshall's equality analysis, and
calls for a multiracial coalition that transcends identity boundaries.
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Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and former Law Clerk to
Justice Thurgood Marshall. This Essay commits to paper an edited version of the
Martin Luther King, Jr. Lecture I delivered at Lewis & Clark Law School on January
28, 2013. The Essay builds on ideas first presented in a speech at Howard Law School
in 2008. Here I explain the implications of Marshall's jurisprudence for twenty-first
century civil rights advocates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Barack Obama's inauguration celebrations and recent commentary
about what it means for America to elect a black president not once but
twice, remind me of the generational transition that has taken place. A
new generation of leadership has emerged, another has receded, and yet
another has died. In contemplating the twentieth anniversary of Thur-
good Marshall's death, I wish to pay homage to a passing breed of Afri-
can-American leader, that commonly known among black elders as the
"race man." I also want to speak forthrightly about whether and how their
brand of civil rights remains relevant in the twenty-first century.
First, what is a race man and was Justice Marshall such a man? In
common parlance, a race man or race woman is simply someone "whose
identity [is] clearly defined as Black," and who acts to bring about the
progression of black people.' Most African-Americans of my father's gen-
eration smile when you say, "Oh, he's a race man." They understand your
meaning and, for them, this is a positive stereotype. Although I have not
yet discovered who actually coined the term, often it is associated with
W.E.B. DuBois, who was first among twentieth century race men in the
minds of many.
Whatever its origin, the term is clearly grounded in a race con-
sciousness that, in turn, was born of racial oppression. In their seminal
study of South Side Chicago, Black Metropolis, published in 1945, sociolo-
gist St. Clair Drake and researcher Horace Cayton describe respectable
"Race Men" and "Race Heroes" of the Bronzeville community3-men
who felt "impelled to prove to themselves continually that they [were]
not the inferior creatures which their minority status implie[d]."'
Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. DuBois, Booker T. Washington. Later,
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X. Perhaps today, the Reverends
Jesse Jackson, Sr. and Al Sharpton. These names have been associated
' Richard McCulloch, The Burden of the New "Race Man," BROWARD TIMEs, Feb.
16, 2007. Clearly President Barack Obama is not a race man, nor should he be. He
represents an emerging cadre of "post-civil rights" black politicians that necessarily
must connect with and represent a wide range of racial, ethnic, and ideological
groups in order to win state and national elections and govern effectively. See generally
GWEN IFILL, THE BREAKTHROUGH: POLITICS AND RACE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA (2009).
2 See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE 1010-11 (Cary D. Wintz &
Paul Finkelman eds., 2004); Ayumu Kaneko, A Strong Man to Run a Race: WE.B.
DuBois and the Politics of Black Masculinity at the Turn of the Century, 14JAPANESEJ. AM.
STUD. 105, 106 (2003); Monica L. Miller, WE.B. DuBois and the Dandy as Diasporic Race
Man, 26 CALLALOo 738, 739 (2003).
' See generally ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A
STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY 12, 379-97 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1993)
(1945). Bronzeville, alternatively known as "the Black Metropolis," is the
neighborhood on the south side of Chicago where many of the great migrants of the
1910s and 1920s located. A black city within a city, Bronzeville was second only to
Harlem in black population. Id.
Id. at 390.
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with the term "race man" and the connotation varies depending on the
person being referenced. Thurgood Marshall's name does not usually
appear in any lists of prototypical race warriors. And yet, Marshall in his
life, his insistent voice, and his clear achievements in liberating black
people from the shackles of Jim Crow subordination, was the quintessen-
tial twentieth century race man. Certainly his jurisprudence was colored
by his race-man tendencies, in the most positive sense of the term. But I
am going to argue that he also brought a race transcending vision of uni-
versal human dignity to the law. First, let me explain the source of Thur-
good Marshall's race consciousness.
It began, or evolved, at Lincoln University. While at Lincoln, he be-
friended an older student who would become the poet laureate of the Ne-
gro community, Langston Hughes. Some of my fondest memories of clerk-
ing for the Justice are the stories he would tell me of going to Greenwich
Village with Hughes to party with a "hip" literary crowd. I was surprised
though, when one day, he told me forthrightly that it was Hughes who
stimulated his race consciousness. When Marshall was an undergraduate,
the Lincoln faculty was completely white, and he admitted to me that he
had been doubtful about whether to integrate the faculty.
This was a part of Marshall's past with which I was not familiar. It was
stunning for me to contemplate that the chief oral advocate in Brown v.
Board of Education had once voted with fellow students against integrating
the Lincoln faculty. "Hughes convinced me to change my mind," he told
me. After an unpleasant encounter at a segregated movie theatre,
Hughes had confronted Marshall about his lax attitude regarding race
issues. Through several intense conversations with Hughes, he began to
see Negro faculty notjust as a positive but an imperative and he personal-
ly led a second successful referendum on the question.'
His consciousness was piqued even more when he entered Howard
Law School under the tutelage of Charles Hamilton Houston, the epito-
me of a race man. Houston, the valedictorian of his class at Amherst,
graduate of Harvard Law School, and a former member of the Harvard
Law Review, became Dean of Howard Law and intentionally sought to
remake it as an engine of social change. Marshall always said in his
chambers that he did not "get serious" until he entered Howard. At the
time, he was talking about his commitment to academics, but I also think
he was talking about his commitment to "the race."
Houston was clearly a seminal influence in his life. At Howard, Mar-
shall embraced the twin values of Houston and earlier generations of
race men. First, excellence. Houston, the valedictorian, demanded that
his students excel and become thoroughly competent masters of the law.
Marshall followed his example, worked harder than he ever had in his
life, and ultimately graduated first in his class.6 Second, agitation. "The
' See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 48-49
(1998).
6 Id. at 59.
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social justification for the Negro lawyer," Houston argued, "is the service
he can render the race as an interpreter and proponent of its rights and
aspiration [s].", He hammered this idea into his students; as lawyers they
would be social engineers or else they would be parasites.
Marshall's early partnership with Houston and storied success as a
civil rights lawyer clearly fulfilled Houston's vision. But this model of civil
rights advocate they invented was not preordained and they sometimes
encountered resistance within the black community. Since the first Afri-
can landed involuntarily in this country in 1619, each generation has had
to choose how and whether to take up the race's struggle. One of my dia-
ry entries underscores the choice involved:
Justice Marshall spoke of "old man Houston"-Charles Hamilton
Houston's father. "Old man Houston used to say, 'You guys are try-
ing to save all the colored folks, uplift the Negro race. We both be-
lieve in it, but I have a different method. I believe in saving one at a
time and as soon as I get through with this one (pointing to self), I
will work on somebody else.'"
II. RACE MAN'SJURISPRUDENCE
Much has been written about Marshall's career before ascending to
the bench and his role as Race Hero, as "Mr. Civil Rights," has been bur-
nished in our minds (or it should be). I want to turn now to Marshall's
jurisprudence, much of which is embodied in the many passionate dis-
sents he wrote during his 24 years on the Court. In those dissents, I dis-
cern the voice of a race man. When he ascended to the Supreme Court,
he maintained the same insistent voice of controlled outrage that some-
times colored his oral arguments when he was standing in front of the
bench. An example of this voice can be seen in his oral argument for
Brown v. Board of Education. In his closing argument, he made a statement
that encapsulated his core theory in Brown:
[W]e submit [that] the only way to arrive at [a] decision [adverse to
the plaintiffs] is to find that for some reason Negroes are inferior to
all other human beings. . . . [W]hy of all of the multitudinous
groups of people in this country [do] you have to single out Ne-
groes and give them this separate treatment[?]'0
Reading the flat transcript, even without the benefit of his leathery
voice, his anger is palpable. A race man looks at his people and sees the
opposite of what society sees. He sees greatness, and sometimes superiori-
7 Charles H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4J. NEGRO EDUC. 49, 49 (1935).
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BRowN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATIONAND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 128 (First Vintage Books
2004) (1975).
' Personal diary entry of Sheryll Cashin (Aug. 16, 1990) (on file with author).
'o ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V.
BoARD OFEDUCA TION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 239 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969).
976 [Vol. 17:4
CIVIL RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
ty-greatness in enduring virulent oppression with dignity; in the ability
of many Negroes notjust to survive but to thrive in the face of daily insults
to their humanity. And this is a sentiment that usually transcends class.
Most race men and women identify with the common man. And no Su-
preme Court Justice in American history was more empathetic to the
plights of ordinary and poor Americans than Thurgood Marshall. He
brought a first-hand experience with ordinary people to his jurispru-
dence over and over again.
At the onset of his long tenure on the Supreme Court, he explicitly
stated a race man's judicial philosophy, one that mirrored the creed he
had learned from Houston. In 1968, one year after he became an Associ-
ate Justice, in a speech he gave at University of Wisconsin Law School, he
argued for "a new kind of activism, an activism in the pursuit of justice"
in order to realize and maintain the promise of the Fourteenth Amend-
iment." He said in another speech he gave a year later at NYU: "True jus-
tice requires that the ideals expressed in [the Reconstruction Amend-
ments] be translated into economic and social progress for all of our
people." He characterized his approach to judging more plainly a dec-
ade later when a law clerk from another chambers asked him to describe
his judicial philosophy. According to Deborah Rhode, one of his clerks at
the time, he said: "You do what you think is right and let the law catch
"'13
up.
Above all for Marshall, doing what was right meant trying to get his
colleagues to face up to and redress America's tortured history of racial
discrimination. Race men remember the history that others would like to
forget. For them the hurts of past centuries are as fresh as if they oc-
curred this morning. Historical memory was central to Marshall's juris-
prudence and historical memory was the source of the anger that some-
times showed up in his opinions and speeches. He was a "Race Hero" to
many when he brought the blithe celebrations of the Constitution's bi-
centennial to a pause with a pointed, widely publicized speech that re-
minded the nation of the framers' hypocrisy:
I do not. . . find the wisdom, foresight, and sense ofjustice exhibit-
ed by the framers particularly profound.
... Moral principles against slavery, for those who had them, were
compromised, with no explanation of the conflicting principles for
Thurgood Marshall, The Continuing Challenge of the 14th Amendment, 1968 Wis.
L. REv. 979, 980.
" Thurgood Marshall, Group Action in Pursuit offustice, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661, 662
(1969), reprinted in THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS,
OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 227, 227 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).
'" Deborah L. Rhode, Letting the Law Catch Up, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1259, 1259 (1992).
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which the American Revolutionary War had ostensibly been
fought[.] 14
Other times, Marshall used humor to bring home his historical
point. When Chief Justice Burger proposed, as part of the bicentennial
celebration, a "pageant in which members of the Court would reenact
the original signing of the" Constitution, Marshall said he would partici-
pate only if the pageant was "faithful to the nation's racial history; [mean-
ing] he would appear in livery and kneebritches, carrying trays."15 Need-
less to say, the reenactment did not take place. 6
In the major race cases in which Marshall opined, he always brought a
race man's historical perspective. If a case involved an issue affecting Afri-
can-Americans, inevitably he viewed it through a lens of slavery and Jim
Crow. Until all vestiges of America's peculiar institutions were eradicated,
he reasoned, the government had a duty to act affirmatively to help Ne-
groes obtain opportunities equal to those enjoyed by other Americans.
This approach is most evident in his dissent in Bakke. He had no
problem whatsoever with a rigid quota system that set aside 16 places for
minority applicants to UC Davis School of Medicine and dissented from
the Court's declaration that such measures were unconstitutional. After
treating his colleagues to an extended recitation on what he termed "the
sorry history of discrimination" in the United States-from slavery to Re-
construction to Jim Crow segregation that endured through the mid-
twentieth century-he followed with a careful explication of this history's
"devastating impact on the lives of Negroes."17 Given this history and its
contemporary impact, he argued, "bringing the Negro into the main-
stream of American life should be a state interest of the highest order."'
Clearly this was a race man's project. Thurgood Marshall intended
through avowed judicial activism to create genuine equality rather than
the kind of formal, abstract equality embraced by his more conservative
brethren. He reasoned that the differences in the historical experience
of African-Americans should entitle them to greater protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is consistent with the judicial philosophy
he espoused in his NYU speech. There he said: "From the perspective of
history, . . . the crucial task is not so much to define our rights and liber-
ties, but to establish institutions which can make the principles embodied
in our Constitution meaningful in the lives of ordinary citizens." 9
Obviously one of the institutions Marshall most cared about was pub-
lic education. I had the privilege of working on a schools case, Board of
" Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1987).
' Rhode, supra note 13, at 1264.
16 Id.
" See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Marshall, supra note 12, at 662.
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Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell.to It was especially poign-
ant to work with him, in the twilight of his career, on the issue for which
he was best known. And it was also very painful. I did not know it then,
but he was halfway through his last active year on the Court. And it was
abundantly clear to him that his vision for a law and an equal protection
clause that produces genuine equality had not come to pass. His brother,
Brennan, had retired before the start of the term, and been replaced by
Justice Souter, whom he liked to call 'Junior." He was 82 and feeble, de-
spite his ample body and still very active mind. Not since his powerful dis-
sent in Milliken v. Bradley, 2 when the Court's consensus on enforcing the
imperatives of Brown first disintegrated, had he had such a pointed op-
portunity to reflect publicly on his life's work.
The Dowell case involved a school desegregation order that was en-
tered against the Oklahoma City school district in 1972-18 years after
the Brown decision-although the school district had maintained segre-
gated schools since its inception in 1907. The plan had produced inte-
grated schools. But once the federal court retreated from supervising the
desegregation order, not surprisingly, local autonomy resulted in a
neighborhood schools plan that recreated several separate, racially iden-
tifiable "black" and "white" elementary schools.
In helping Marshall craft his dissent, I spent a good deal of time with
him talking about the history of school desegregation litigation and the
major "race" cases. It was very interesting for me to contemplate why a
"race man" who himself had benefited greatly from studying at two racial-
ly identifiable universities would care so much about the integration ide-
al. At the time, an effort to create schools for black boys had received
considerable attention in the news media.
Marshall said [such a school] would only make black kids vulnera-
ble. "When a budget cut is required, where would the ax fall first?"
he argued. He offered an analogy to World War II. When the U.S.
military was contemplating a very dangerous mission in which it ex-
pected two-thirds of the unit to suffer casualties, "what unit would
get picked first?" he said.
Clearly Marshall did not harbor any Jim Crow nostalgia. And it did
not matter to him that racial segregation in schools now mirrored racial
segregation in neighborhoods-especially since the school board's prior
manipulations in creating all-black schools had contributed to white par-
25
ents' preferences about where to live. In his dissent, he stated: "I believe
a desegregation decree cannot be lifted so long as conditions likely to in-
flict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I persist and there remain
20 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
2 418 U.S. 717, 781 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
22 Dowell, 498 U.S. at 251 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
21 See id. at 242.
Personal diary entry of Sheryll Cashin (Apr. 3, 1991) (on file with author).
25 See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 265 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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feasible methods of eliminating such conditions."" For Marshall, no con-
dition perpetuated stigmatic injury more than racially identifiable
schools. He knew all too well that "all-Afro-American schools" risked the
"relative indifference of school boards." He cited empirical evidence
that many black schools "suffer from high student-faculty ratios, lower
quality teachers, inferior facilities and physical conditions, and lower
quality course offerings and extracurricular programs."
In his chambers he was very upset. He had rehearsed with us, his
clerks, the arguments he intended to use in the conference room with his
colleagues. And they were a race man's arguments, the kind of truth tell-
ing that makes some people uncomfortable. "Am I obliged to keep saying
that things are going to get better?" He worried aloud about what he
would say to a poor black kid about his life chances, given the schools
and neighborhoods to which such kids were relegated. "They are now re-
establishing on another basis the same [Jim Crow segregation that Brown
was supposed to eradicate]. Before they used the law, now they are using
residential segregation. Negroes are not that stupid," he said in exaspera-
tion. Then he proceeded to tell us a heart-wrenching story about a black
man he once encountered who told him he wanted to be reborn a white
person because of all the privileges white folks enjoyed. "The only way to
be superior is to have someone inferior and your subconscious prevents
you from telling the truth," he said aloud. 9
This was my toughest day on the job. This normally humorous man,
so full of joy, despite his gruff exterior, was at a loss as to how to stop the
inevitable. He was partially effective, though. In Dowell, the Court merezhinted at what would be necessary to end a school desegregation order.
The Court waited until Justice Marshall had died before it declared, es-
sentially, that it was time for federal courts to retreat altogether from po-
31licing school desegregation.
' Id. at 252.
27 Id. at 260 n.5.
2 Id.
9 All of the quotations in this paragraph are supported by: Personal diary entry
of Sheryll Cashin (Apr. 3, 1991) (on file with author).
* See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 243-45.
" See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100-03 (1995) (holding that the district
court exceeded its remedial authority when it required across-the-board salary
increases and continued funding for remedial education as part of a desegregation
decree); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992) (holding that a district court
may incrementally turn over supervision of a school district before total compliance
had been reached); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 747-48 (2007) (holding that certain voluntary, non-court-ordered
school racial integration plans were unconstitutional).
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III. RACE-TRANSCENDING JURISPRUDENCE
Of course, Marshall's race-man perspective also compelled him to be
an ardent advocate for other disadvantaged groups. For him, the Negro
was a miner's canary for the nation. He spoke explicitly of the linkage be-
tween "minority" and "majority" rights in a speech he gave to the Second
Circuitjudicial conference in 1989:
History teaches that when the Supreme Court has been willing to
shortchange the equality rights of minority groups, other basic per-
sonal civil liberties like the rights of free speech and to personal se-
curity against unreasonable searches and seizures are also threat-
ened.
He continued, "We forget at our peril [the historical lesson
that] . . . the fates of equal rights and liberty rights are inexorably inter-
twined .
Thurgood Marshall's commitment to uplift his own people led him
to espouse an equal opportunity vision for the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, particularly in the realm of education. In his majestic dissent in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, he spoke of "the right
of every American to an equal start in life, so far as the provision
of .. . education is concerned. " His experiences with racism and racial
segregation also led him to reject any caste system.34 Indeed, for him the
central principle animating the Reconstruction Amendments was to
eradicate any state actions that relegated human beings to second-class
citizenship. For this reason, he was by far the most consistent advocate on
the Court for the poor.
His brand of race-transcending equal justice can be seen in his dis-
sent in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,3 a case in which the Court up-
held a North Dakota statute that authorized some school districts to
charge fees for school bus services. "The intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to abolish caste legislation[,]" he argued. "When state
action has the predictable tendency to entrap the poor and create a
" Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Confernce of the Second Circuit [The
Future of Civil Rights] (Sept. 8, 1989), in THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES,
WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES, supra note 12, at 216, 217-18.
Cf Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that while in that case railroad workers subjected to involuntary
drug tests were the victims of the majority's niling, "ultimately, today's decision will
reduce the privacy all citizens may enjoy"); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 96-97 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]ll Americans will be a
little poorer" as a result of the Court's decision not to respect the religious freedoms
of the respondent).
* 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (MarshallJ., dissenting).
See Cass R. Sunstein, On Marshall's Conception of Equality, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1267,
1270 (1992).
' 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
6 Id. at 469 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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',37
permanent underclass, that intent is frustrated.' Once again, it took a
race man's realist perspective to comprehend how a bus fee could entrap
poor folks. A man who had personally experienced impecuniosity and
worked for and among poor people, understood how even a modest fee
was a very real barrier to education for children like Sarita Kadrmas.
In a series of opinions, Marshall argued for heightened scrutiny un-
der the Equal Protection Clause of any conditions that suggested caste
status. These opinions suggest a view that "no one should be deprived,
without good reason, of adequate education, police protection, food,
shelter, or medical care."3 8 "Certainly Marshall believed that poor people
could not be deprived of access to the basic institutions of a democratic
societ, including the political process, the judicial process, and educa-
tion." "
Marshall's jurisprudence seems anachronistic in an era when displays
of "empathy" by judges or judicial appointees are derided by conserva-
tives as inappropriate. He believed that the courts were supposed to ag-
gressively promote equal opportunity and equal justice. And a litany of
non-black, non-poor litigants benefited from this vision, including "pris-
oners, minors, older people, . . . persons with disabilities, Native Ameri-
cans, members of religious minorities, immigrants . . . , fathers, wom-
en, . . . students, . . . protestors, and members of racial minorities., 40
37id
"Id.
m Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1272 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 337
(1980) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 259-62
(1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall,J., dissenting)).
3 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 1272 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 458 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting)). In Kras, Marshall expressed
indignation at the majority's minimizing of the impact of a $2.00 filing fee, stating, "I
cannot agree with the majority that it is so easy for the desperately poor to save $1.92
each week over the course of six months. The 1970 Census found that over 800,000
families in the Nation had annual incomes of less than $1,000 or $19.23 a week. I see
no reason to require that families in such straits sacrifice over 5% of their annual
income as a prerequisite to getting a discharge in bankruptcy. It may be easy for some
people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has
had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin of
survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may destroy whatever
savings they may have accumulated, and by eliminating a sense of security may
destroy the incentive to save in the future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for
them, not a routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The desperately
poor almost never go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost
weekly activity. They have more important things to do with what little money they
have-like attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras must
do. It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires.
But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon
unfounded assumptions about how people live." 409 U.S. at 459-60 (footnote and
citation omitted).
40 Martha Minow, A Tribute to justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REv. 66, 67
(1991) (footnotes omitted). Minow's A TDibute to justice Thurgood Marshall categorizes
Marshall's dissenting opinions as follows: prisoners: see Ky. Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); minors: see Schall v.
982 [Vol. 17:4
CIVIL RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
While Marshall's activist vision of equal justice was not embraced by
the Rehnquist Court and also has no traction with the Roberts Court, poli-
tics in America may be catching up with his vision. The multi-racial, multi-
class coalition that supported President Obama is premised on the kind of
optimistic, equal opportunity vision that Justice Marshall had for the law.
As Obama suggested in his second inaugural address, "We the People" in-
cludes an array of folks, from striving immigrants to gays and lesbians
seeking to marry to poor, huddled masses struggling to get into and stay
in the middle class. Obama also spoke of the need for this rainbow of
humanity to engage in "collective action" for the greater good .
African-Americans heartened by Obama's presidency seem to accept
that Obama cannot and should not be a "race" man. They understand
that winning elections necessitates finding common ground. After all, it
is rather hard to be a voter, let alone a center-left black president, today.
The political landscape is fraught with peril and obstructions. A majority
of whites vote republican and even larger majorities of people of color
vote democratic. Partisan gerrymandering renders the U.S. House of
Representatives unrepresentative of popular vote counts. Senate rules or
those who would abuse them enable ideological purity to subordinate the
common good. What should a civil rights or progressive advocate do?
The courts seem an even less propitious forum for advancing social jus-
tice than do legislatures.
Justice Marshall's race-transcending jurisprudence, like Obama's
race-straddling politics, offers a vision for twenty-first century civil rights
and progressive policy advocacy. In a bewilderingly diverse future, none
of us can afford to be single-issue or single-constituency people. Justice
Marshall ultimately seemed to understand that. His race-transcending ju-
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); older people: see Pub.
Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 182 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mass. Bd.
of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); persons with
disabilities: see U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 613
(1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Native
Americans: see Or. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 775
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); members of religious minorities: see Ansonia Bd. of
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 71 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); immigrants: see Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 858 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1060 (1984)
(Marshall,J., dissenting); fathers: see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 800 (1977) (Marshall,J., dissenting); women: see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Marshall,J., dissenting);
students: see Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); protestors: see Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 301
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); members of racial minorities: see City of Richmond
v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 See Inaugural Address, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1-2 (Jan. 21, 2013).
4 Id. at 1.
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risprudence displayed concern for the equality interests of all human be-
ings who struggle. Advocates necessarily must pursue ajustice that routes
out all forms of caste or exclusion. As Dr. King famously wrote in his let-
ter from Birmingham: "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice every-
where."" In order to be relevant or successful in the twenty-first century,
a civil rights agenda must resonate across many identity boundaries.
The new frontier in civil rights work in the twenty-first century will be
strategies that overtly attempt to bring struggling whites into the civil
rights tent. Thus far in civil rights discourse, the ticket to entry under that
rubric was that you had to diverge somehow from the privileged position
of white males. Centuries of civil rights struggle focused on affording to
people who were not white males the same public and private goods that
white men received. Admittedly, asking civil rights advocates to consider
how to bring working class whites, including white males, into the civil
rights tent may be discomfiting to progressives. It bears emphasis that
Marshall's vision of equality under the Reconstruction Amendments was
premised on economic and social progress "for all of our people." In
opinion polls, ordinary whites express pessimism about their life chances
that people of color, perhaps cheered by Obama's election, are less apt
to harbor. Indeed, most whites perceive anti-white bias as a bigger social
problem than anti-black bias.
This poses a serious dilemma for advocates and political parties that
need to get to 55% in order to govern. As Dr. King said in explaining his
vision of a future Beloved Community, the end of the civil rights move-
ment was reconciliation, the kind of racial transcendence that Marshall's
equality analysis reflected .' The most enduring of civil rights victories
were won because of the moral salience of the cry for universal human
dignity. The positive corollary to the late Derrick Bell's influential inter-
est-convergence critique is that when the interests of whites and people
of color do converge, the country has witnessed great leaps forward in
equality guarantees. * Because of demographic change and the common
indignities of the Great Recession, I believe the country is ripe for anoth-
er quantum leap forward. Elsewhere I have written about the language
" MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR., Letter from Birringham Jail: April 16, 1963, in MARTIN
LUTHER KING,JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76, 77 (1963).
1 See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum
Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. ScI. 215, 215-17 (2011).
1 See Martin Luther King, Jr., The Power of Non-Violence (June 4, 1957), in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING,JR. 12, 12 (James M. Washington ed., 1986). By "racial transcendcnce" I do not
mean color blindness or post-racialism. On the contrary, Marshall saw race and racism
in full historical context. His intimate, lived understanding of race and how it operates
in American society informed his judgment about other forms of oppression.
" See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 522-28 (1980) (noting that abolition, the
Reconstruction Amendments, and Brown v. Board of Education resulted only when the
interests of blacks and the white majority converged).
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and overt practice necessary for bringing more whites into the progres-
sive fold. 7 In this work I have focused on the theory and practice of mul-
tiracial coalition building as a mechanism for achieving common ground
and the common good. I call on civil rights advocates to pursue strategies
that encourage, rather than discourage, multiracial alliances. In the
realm of affirmative action, for example, that might mean seeking mark-
ers other than race to achieve diverse classrooms and work places. Mar-
shall's life-long commitment to the ideal of integration, like Dr. King's
commitment to the creation of the Beloved Community, is premised on
the idea that equality means real inclusion in American society. I could
offer a laundry list of public policies necessary to achieving that, from
fair-share affordable housing, to inclusionary zoning, to school integra-
tion, and dismantling our current system of mass incarceration. In that
list, I would also include constitutional protection for same-sex marriage
and the passage of comprehensive immigration reform. None of this will
come to pass without powerful, multiracial alliances.
Fortunately, changing demographics and rising interracial intimacy
are enhancing possibilities for culturally dexterous whites and progres-
sive people of color to form such coalitions. 9 The peril with demograph-
ic and cultural change is that those who fear it inevitably mount re-
sistance. Unfortunately it is often easier to exploit racial fears than to
transcend them. Throughout American history, economic elites used ra-
cial categories and racism to drive a wedge between working class whites
and people of color they might ally with. In the colonial era indentured
servitude gave way to white freedom and black slavery so that white serv-
ants no longer had incentive to join blacks in revolt. In the late-
nineteenth century, Jim Crow laws proliferated when a biracial farmers'
alliance threatened to change unfair financial policies imposed by elites.
And the GOP devised a cynical, race-coded southern strategy that broke
up the multiracial alliance that made the New Deal possible. Given this
history and its current manifestations, intentional efforts are sorely need-
" See Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative Action and the Geography of
Educational Opportunity, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
(James Beckman ed., Greenwood Press) (forthcoming); Sheryll Cashin, Shall We
Overcome? "Post-Racialism" and Inclusion in the 21st Century, I ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
31, 31-47 (2011); Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and
Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST.JOHN's L. REv. 253, 281-90 (2005).
See Cashin, Place, Not Race, supra note 47.
* Cultural dexterity, a phrase I coined, is the ability to walk into a room and be
outnumbered by people of a different race or ethnicity and experience excitement
rather than fright. If you have recently had a meal in the home of someone of a
different race you are probably culturally dexterous. According to social psychology
research, dexterous whites are more likely than other whites to support policies
designed to promote diversity and reduce inequality. For a brief overview of trends in
interracial intimacy and the potential positive impact on politics, see Sheryll Cashin,
Moving Toward a Culturally Dexterous Washington, WASH. PosT BLOGS: THE RooTDC (Aug.
3, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/therootdc/post/moving-
toward-a-culturally-dexterous-washington/2012/08/02/gQAcQIkSXblog.html.
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ed to begin to rebuild trust among "we the people" and to recapture a
sense of collective will to protect the common good.
The good news for progressive advocates is that most Americans of
every color believe in the ideals of racial and economic fairness. The bad
news is that they never get to stop working to make these ideals real for
ordinary people. Justice Marshall understood that the fight for justice is
never over. When the City of Baltimore erected a statue of him in 1980,
he said at the unveiling: "I just want to be sure that when you see this
statue, you won't think that's the end of it. I won't have it that way.
There's too much work to be done.,5 0
I am sure that were he still with us he would have said the same thing
at the naming of an airport after him. And were he here, he would have
offered a similar observation about Obama's Second Inaugural. Oh, he
would have been tickled, I think, at this dramatic acceleration of the pos-
sibilities for his people. But after the celebrations Marshall would say
"this is not the end of it. There's [still] too much work to be done." And
it is my hope that the next generation, those who currently suffer the
challenges of law school, will heed his message and choose to engage in
the justice issues of their time.
* Dale Russakoff, Tribute to Marshall: City of Baltimore Dedicates Statue to 1st Native
Son on High Court, WASH. POST, May 17, 1980, at Cl, quoted in Sunstein, supra note 34,
at 1275.
" See id.
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